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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Christina Chatwin was injured when she was struck (as a pedestrian) by a
semi-trailer insured by Canal. The district court correctly held that although owners of
semi-trailers may choose to refrain from purchasing PIP coverage (i.e., opt out)
pursuant to subsection 302(2), Canal's insured (i.e., the owner of the semi-trailer)
purchased PIP coverage from Canal (i.e., opted in). Therefore, Canal was obligated to
provide PIP benefits to Christina Chatwin.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Regal had no right to enforce Christina
Chatwin's right to recover PIP benefits from Canal. It reasoned that subrogation was
replaced by intercompany arbitration; therefore, Regal's only remedy was arbitration.
The truth is that Regal accrued to all the rights of Christina Chatwin, and Regal
(hereinafter "Christina Chatwin") seeks to enforce her rights under Canal's insurance
policy. Christina Chatwin does not seek to apportion fault to the person who is or
would be held legally liable. This is not a negligence case or a case based on
negligence principles. This case involves a determination of insurance coverage for
Christina Chatwin. Canal may not rely upon section 309(6) simply by asserting that,
under different facts and circumstances, such section is normally applicable as
between insurers while ignoring that this is a case between Christina Chatwin and her
PIP carrier — Canal — pursuant to section 309(4).

1

ARGUMENT
I.

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE
NO-FAULT STATUTE DOES NOT PREEMPT REGAL'S
COMMON LAW RIGHT OF SUBROGATION.

Although neither Canal nor the Utah Court of Appeals explicitly engaged in a
preemption analysis, "preemption" is the legal rule underlying most of the respective
analyses and disagreements pending before this Court. While it is certainly true that
the common law right of subrogation was partially preempted by the no-fault statute
under the limited circumstances which are redressed specifically by section 309(6) and
analyzed in the cases relied upon by Canal (at pp. 11-12), those circumstances (i.e., the
legal liability of the PIP carriers' respective insureds) does not exist in this case.
Therefore, section 309(6) simply does not apply:
This lawsuit concerns the threshold question of whether the Canal
policy provided coverage. It does not concern the allocation of
fault issues which are the subject of the inter-party arbitration
scheme contemplated in this section.
Judge Nehring's Minute Entry re: attorney fees, attached to Regal5s opening Brief as
Exhibit C.
Having reached this initial conclusion (which neither Canal nor the Court of
Appeals addressed at all), it is then necessary (if one insists on asserting preemption)
to determine whether the legislative intent was to eliminate all subrogation regardless
of the circumstances underlying specific cases. This analysis involves a complete
understanding of every element of the no-fault statute with an eye toward effectuating
2

legislative intent in practice. More specifically, this involves determining whether the
dicta relied upon by the Court of Appeals and Canal are sufficiently broad to logically
infer the complete abrogation of all subrogation and, necessarily, all
traditionally-recognized equitable powers. This Court recently analyzed statutory
preemption of common law rights in the context of discrimination on the basis of sex.
See Gottling v. P.R.. Inc., 2002 UT 95.
Whether legislation is intended to blanket a particular field — and
thereby preempt existing or developing common law — is
obviously a question of legislative intent. Richardson v. Matador
Steak House, Inc., 948 P.2d 347, 350 (Utah 1997). In short, we
must decide if the legislature, with its broad law-making power,
intended to exercise that power and to occupy the field in such a
way as to exclude the contemporaneous application and
development of the common law. See Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000
UT 23, f 11, 997 P.2d 305. Generally, when answering this
question we apply the two-tiered analysis for determining
preemptive intent established by the United States Supreme Court.
Id.; Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26,112, 995 P.2d
1237. We recently summarized this analytical framework as
follows:
[i] Sometimes courts, when facing the pre-emption
question, find language in the . . . statute that reveals an
explicit [legislative] intent to pre-empt [common] law. [ii]
More often, explicit pre-emption language does not appear,
or does not directly answer the question. In that event,
courts must consider whether the . .. statute's "structure and
purpose," or nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless
reveal a clear, but implicit, preemptive intent, [a] A .. .
statute, for example, may create a scheme of [statutory]
regulation "so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that [the legislature] left no room for the [common
law] to supplement it." [b] Alternatively, [statutory] law
3

may be in "irreconcilable conflict" with [the common] law.
Compliance with both .. ., for example, may be a "physical
impossibility," or, [c] the [common] law may "stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purpose and objectives of [the legislature]." Gilger, 2000
UT 23 at \ 11, 997 P.2d 305 {quoting Barnett Bank of
Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31, 116 S. Ct. 1103,
134 L. Ed. 2d 237 (1996)); see also Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 36 L. Ed. 2d 547, 93 S.
Ct. 1854 (1973); 2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Stat.
Constr. § 50:05, at 156 (6th ed. 2001) ("Where
common-law principles, associated with the subject
matter of a statute, are not expressly affirmed or denied,
the extent to which the common law is altered or
changed is left to implication."). Thus, where a statute's
plain language or its structure and purpose demonstrate a
legislative intent to preempt an area of the law, the statute
becomes the only source of law in that area, and the
development and application of common law principles
necessarily ceases.
Gottling v. P.R.. Inc.. 2002 UT 95 at | 8 (bold added) (concluding that "[t]he
language of this 'exclusivity provision' unambiguously indicates that the UADA
preempts 'common law causes of action' for employment discrimination based on the
'specific grounds' it lists." Id at ^ 9).
Canal asserts, in essence, that section 309(6) resembles an exclusivity
provision. Where the "specific grounds" of a dispute between two insurers is one PIP
carrier's allegation that the insured of the other PIP carrier was or would be more
liable than its own insured, the only remedy and venue is intercompany arbitration.
However, where, as here, those specific grounds are not present, a determination as to
preemption must arise, if at all, from implication. And that requires an interpretation
4

of the no-fault statute in a manner consistent with legislative intent.

A.

Section 309(6) Does Not Occupy tke Field.

The legislature did not intend to "occupy the field" by adopting the mandatory
arbitration provision of section 309(6). Stated more precisely, the arbitration clause is
not a specific ground of preemption at all.
At first blush, one might infer that section 309(6) is a specific ground of
preemption, but that inference would be overly-simplistic, misleading, and backward.
Instead of occupying the common law field, the mandatory arbitration provision
extends statutory rights to replace common law rights which were abrogated because
of the design of the no-fault statute.
Of course, it is true that the no-fault statute occupied a portion of the insurance
and tort fields. Subjects covered by legislation, and those to which the legislation
must logically extend, are preempted.
Section 309(1) abrogates the right of a person to recover special damages which
are covered by no-fault and also general damages — subject to a specific threshold.
This abrogation of the rights of the person into whose shoes an insurer would step
resulted in the implicit elimination of subrogation rights as a secondary effect. There
was a legislative intent to restore rights by the adoption of section 309(6). In other
words, there was no legislative intent to destroy or eliminate any subrogation — much
less all subrogation.
5

Canal relies (at pp. 11-12) on some overly broad dicta from this Court which,
Canal insists, preclude any and all subrogation rights. The underlined words which
are claimed to be dispositive of any and all disagreements between PIP carriers
include "only" and "must." But those words are only correct statements of the law
when viewed within the context of those cases. All of the cases cited by Canal deal
with recovery of PIP benefits from the insurer of the tortfeasor or from the insured's
recovery from the tortfeasor. None of those cases deals with the primacy of an
insurer's coverage obligation. Because the context demonstrates the limitations of
those cases, the limiting terms cannot be applied to this situation.
Rather than citing an abstract rule that does not apply to the facts before us, one
must, instead, review the structure of the no-fault statute and the legislative intent
behind the statutory language. There is no question that preemption would arise from
the legislature's desire to eliminate all subrogation regardless of the factual basis
therefor; but there is not any basis for drawing this conclusion.
Instead, the obvious legislative purpose behind the extension of the right of
reimbursement (as a substitute for subrogation) was to apportion costs associated with
negligence to the insurers of negligent parties and, thus, ultimately to the negligent
parties themselves through their payment of higher premiums commensurate with the
risks posed by their driving histories. If this legislative goal were impacted by
permitting subrogation in this case, preemption could possibly be inferred.

6

Courts did not implement the distinction between subrogation and
reimbursement until 1980 in the well-known Ivie decision (probably because, in
practice, it is usually a distinction without a difference). The Ivie court's discussion of
the no-fault statute is an example of "implication." The court noted:
Under Section [41-12a-304], there are two consequences to the
owner of a motor vehicle who fails to have the security required
by [the no-fault statute]: first, he has no immunity from tort
liability; second, he impersonally liable for the benefits provided
under Section [307]. The only logical inference is that if a party
has the security required [by the no-fault statute], the no-fault
insurance act confers two privileges: first, he is granted partial
tort immunity; second, he is not personally liable for the
benefits provided under Section [3071]. He does, however,
1

The Ivie court assumed that PIP benefits were identifiable from the language
of Section 307 and that courts would protect insureds' right to receive the benefits.
The legislative intent is clear that the no-fault statute was intended to create a simple
commercial transaction to partially replace tort litigation. The benefits provided by
the no-fault statute were supposed to make the insurers' payment of expenses to
injured motorists as simple as selling apples at a store. If one goes to a grocery store
to buy apples, there is a simple contract: payment of $1.00 for every pound of apples
(limit 3 lbs. per customer). One chooses ten apples and takes them to the check-out
clerk. The check-out clerk weighs the apples and announces the price term of $3.00.
The customer pays for the apples (the customer's performance), and the clerk delivers
the bag of apples (the store's performance). A grocery store may not randomly call
the produce clerk to the front of the store to peer in the bag and announce that he
prefers oranges, thereby permitting the check-out clerk to declare that despite the
payment of $3.00 and the terms of the contract entitling the customer to receive the
ten apples, "accordingly" the customer is only entitled to delivery of five of the
apples that were paid for and the grocery store, "accordingly," gets to keep the full
$3.00. This is true regardless of the debatable wisdom of the produce clerk's
predilection for oranges as opposed to apples. The foregoing analogy is slightly
imprecise because: (1) even the least sophisticated consumer understands apples;
whereas most consumers do not understand insurance, and (2) one who chooses
apples over oranges may simply have to take supplements to achieve a balanced diet;
whereas one who chooses not to purchase PIP coverage is certain to be deemed a
7

remain liable for customary tort claims, viz., general damages and
economic losses not compensated by the benefits paid under
Section [307], where the threshold provisions of Section [30]9(1)
are met.
*

*

*

The obvious legislative intent was to encourage compliance with
the security provisions of the act. The design to compel
compliance included not only [explicit] partial tort exemption [set
forth in section 309(1)], but [inferred] immunity frompersonal
liability for paymentf2] of the benefits provided for under [section
307].
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie. 606 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 1980) (emphasis in original, bold
added). In other words, the legislature explicitly abrogated the right of an injured
person to sue for general damages. What the Ivie court then did was to infer personal
immunity. This gloss was clarified by setting forth the trigger of personal immunity
(i.e., the maintenance of PIP coverage) and the scope of the personal immunity (i.e.,
for general damages and the expenses which would be covered by PIP coverage)
despite the legislature's limited explicit reference to "general damages" and the limited
imposition of liability for expenses covered by PIP coverage in Section 41-12a-304.3
This inference of personal immunity arose because the Ivie court was

criminal by the courts and be divested of his liberty and property.
2

Incongruously, a PIP carrier which breaches its contractual obligations and
refuses to make "payments" (because it knows that it will never be held accountable
in the courts of this state) can unilaterally extinguish the complying tortfeasor's
immunity.
3

This is the creation of liability which did not exist at common law because it
imposes liability on the owner of the vehicle for breaching a statutory duty.
8

attempting to give effect to all provisions of the no-fault statute and to ignore none. It
could not rationalize the inclusion of arbitration with the waiver4 of immunity by those
who do not maintain PIP coverage.
Jones assumed without analysis that section [309(6)] incorporated
an equitable right of subrogation: "[T]he statute specifically
affords subrogation rights and arbitration between insurers
whenever no-fault benefits are paid." Jones, 592 P.2d at 611.
However, Ivie analyzed the basic purpose and intent of the
No-Fault Act for the first time and stated that section [309(6)]
did not permit an equitable right of subrogation for PIP payments.
See Ivie, 606 P.2d at 1201-03. This is true, Ivie stated, because a
tortfeasor's "personal liability does not include PIP payments." Id.
at 1203 (emphasis added). Since a liability insurer stands in the
shoes of a tortfeasor, a liability insurer is not liable to a tort
victim for PIP payments. "Thus, the tort victim's recovery from
the liability insurer cannot be reduced by the PIP payments." Id.
Accordingly, Ivie held that a PIP insurer has "no right of
subrogation to the [tort victim's] recovery." Id.
Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall 1999 UT 33 at % 12, 978 P.2d 460 (bold added).

In other words, the legislature did not intend to exterminate subrogation or
equity. Instead, subrogation's limited demise was a secondary effect of the
legislature's desire to encourage motorists to obtain the security provided by the
no-fault statute by extending quick, efficient, and "prompt payment of certain[5]

4

The courts have never called it a "waiver," but that is a fair characterization
of Section 41-12a-304.
5

Of course, the benefits are no longer "certain;" rather the minimal losses
which are covered are apparently "factual issues" subject to expensive, standardless,
and interminable litigation. See Prince v. Bear River, 2002 UT 68. Therefore,
9

minimal losses" while "reducing[6] the possibilities for controversy and litigation
between no-fault insurers and their insureds." Ivie, 606 P.2d at 1205, 1203.

B.

Section 309(4) Should Not Be Rendered Meaningless.

Having reviewed section 309(6) and a thumbnail sketch of the legislative intent
behind the no-fault statute together with some practical considerations, the Court must
backtrack to section 309(4) to give effect to the express language of that clause while
not ignoring section 309(5). Regal is not pursuing a common-law cause of action.
Instead, Regal is attempting to avail itself of a statutory right provided for Christina
Chatwin in section 309(4). This statutory right is pursued through a common-law
procedural device which arose from an "equitable assignment" of Christina Chatwin's
rights to Regal after Regal paid Christina Chatwin's lawful debts to her medical
providers.
Section 309(5) requires a PIP carrier to pay benefits to injured motorists within
30 days. There are no exceptions for allegedly secondary carriers. Any alleged
personal immunity for losses which would be covered is not a privilege extended to
the insured tortfeasor unless and until it is proven, somehow, that those incurred-andrecoverable-under-tort-law expenses were "covered" and paid by the victim's PIP
coverage. Obviously, the analysis provided by the Ivie court regarding legislative
intent and the design of the no-fault statute is now of dubious value in light of newer,
directly-contrary precedent. However, the newer precedent is unclear and is not
absolutely necessary, in the opinion of Regal, for this preemption analysis. Regal
therefore partially ignores those serious problems in this analysis.
6

Of course, controversy is no longer "reduced;" instead it has been increased
a hundred-fold as a result of this Court's recent conclusions.
10

exceptions from the 30-day payment requirement would be preempted.7 Section
309(4) and section 309(5) must be reconciled. Either (a) the secondary carrier can
delay beyond the 30-day payment requirement (rendering time to be not "of the
essence"), or (b) the secondary carrier must obey the 30-day requirement and obtain a
right of subrogation. Because permitting the secondary carrier the right to delay
payment is inconsistent with legislative intent, that right may not be inferred. Because
forcing secondary carriers to pay within 30 days without a right of subrogation would
essentially make secondary carriers primary, that solution may not prevail because it
would render section 309(4) meaningless (or, at best, completely impractical).
Subrogation, in this instance, is not a continuation or development of the
common law. Instead, it is a mechanism to implement section 309(4). Because it is
essentially a procedural device rather than a substantive development of the law, the
foregoing preemption analysis is not really applicable, but it was useful to an
understanding of why Canal and the Utah Court of Appeals are wrong.
No insurance company will pay secondary claims if their remedy against the
primary carrier is thereby eliminated. Public policy had always been in favor of
payment to injured insureds by insurance companies. Concomitant with the goal of
7

See American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, n. 2
(1999) ("Before the 1993 amendments [which added an "unless" clause to language
nearly identical to section 309(5)], Pennsylvania restricted the ability of an insurer
(after liability had been established, of course) to defer workers' compensation
medical benefits, including payment for unreasonable and unnecessary treatment,
beyond 30 days of receipt of the bill." Id at 53-54).
11

prompt and fair treatment of insureds is the insurer's rights with respect to other
insurers to which the secondary insurer accrues pursuant to the doctrine of
subrogation. The goal of prompt and fair treatment of insureds would be completely
undermined by the Court of Appeals's unprincipled conclusion that all subrogation
was eliminated.

C.

Canals Example Demonstrates Its Error.

Canal sets forth an example (at p. 13) which demonstrates the source of its
error. Canal proposes a simple two-vehicle accident. It argues that under Regal's
theory, the insurers of both vehicles "would be considered more 'primary' than" the
insurer of the injured passenger.
Canal makes the common mistake of merging and confusing analytically
distinct concepts — to wit: coverage and liability. The insurer of the vehicle occupied
by the hypothetical passenger would be the primary "insurer" of the passenger. This
passenger also would be entitled to secondary (a.k.a. excess) "coverage" through his
own insurer. This passenger would not be entitled to any "coverage" from the insurer
of the hypothetical "at-fault" vehicle. Contrary to Canal's assertion, the insurer of the
"at-fault" vehicle is not more "primary." That insurer is only involved for two
reasons: (1) to reimburse the other carrier(s) pursuant to section 309(6) if its insured
"is or would be legally liable;" and (2) to answer for its insured's legal liability, if any.
Both situations are tort-based.
12

Canal's failure to distinguish between liability (tort) and coverage (contract) is
the source of its assertion that the trial court's ruling would clutter the courts with
lawsuits calling reimbursement subrogation. The trial court's analysis is correct and
would only lead to litigation where, as here, the issue is the enforcement of a statutory
right which was not "abrogated" by the no-fault statute — rather it was "created" by
the no-fault statute's other insurance clause (a.k.a. section 309(4)).
II.

PERMITTING SUBROGATION UNDER THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES DOES NOT CONTRADICT THE
NO-FAULT STATUTE; RATHER IT AIDS IN THE PROPER
RESOLUTION OF PIP CLAIMS.

Because permitting subrogation where the secondary carrier pays PIP benefits
which are primarily owed by the primary carrier advances the legislative intent and
does not conflict with the statute, subrogation is not preempted. The primary goal of
the legislature at the time it adopted the no-fault statute was to provide penurious
benefits to injured motorists without litigation. This public policy should prevail over

13

insurers' worries about reimbursement from primary carriers,8 potential collusion,9 or
subjective and foundationless second opinions.10
The method adopted by the Court of Appeals would require complete
exhaustion of an insured's claims against the primary carrier together with an implied,
limitless expansion of the 30-day payment period. This exhaustion requirement would
become a condition precedent to an injured motorist's right to receive benefits from
his own (excess) carrier. It would include not only submitting a claim to the primary
carrier, but also, presumably, fully litigating the primary carrier's proffered excuse of
nonperformance. While this method is operable in theory, it is inconsistent with

This means that public policy favors both the payment of some
undeserving insureds and the overpayment of some disputed claims.
One support for this public policy norm is the desire to encourage the
insurance industry to finance losses. This aspect of the public will
requires that insurers be permitted to recover by subrogation
colorable claims paid, even if, in the end, these claims were not, strictly
speaking covered.
74 Tex. L. Rev. 1361, Quinn, Michael Sean (reviewing Subrogation. Restitution, and
Indemnification The Law of Subrogation, Mitchell, Charles (Oxford University Press
1994)) (addressing the "volunteer" component of subrogation).
9

See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231. 234 (Utah 1985).

10

But see Prince v. Bear River; Tucker v. State Farm; Pennington v. Allstate.
This Court has apparently decided to follow New Jersey's unconstitutionally vague
interpretation of Utah's legislative intent by authorizing individualized litigation
addressing "excessive" rehabilitation (instead of recognizing that this asserted right of
litigation in every claim was preempted by section 307(2)(d) which protects insurers
against "patterns" of "excessive" treatment). New Jersey, by the way, has (a) the
highest premiums in the nation, and (b) insurers which are going bankrupt (e.g., State
Farm Indemnity recently announced that it will no longer write auto policies there).
14

legislative intent and, as explained above, is impractical in reality and, therefore,
would render section 309(4) virtually meaningless. The natural result of any
unprincipled hurdle to recovery of the minimal benefits identified by the no-fault
statute is the elimination of predictability and the escalation of pointless and
uneconomic litigation. Neither insurers nor insureds benefit from unnecessary
loopholes or unprincipled hurdles.
Therefore, the only method which does not contradict the no-fault statute is the
method proposed by Regal. Subrogation is, therefore, appropriate and not preempted.

III.

ATTORNEY FEES AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ARE
MANDATORY.

Attorney fees and prejudgment interest at the rate of 1 Vi% per month are
mandatory in order to avoid undermining the legislative goal that PIP benefits be paid
to insureds "immediate[ly] . . . without having to bring a lawsuit." Versluis v.
Guaranty National Cos.. 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992). The Utah Court of Appeals
mischaracterized this enforcement mechanism as a "penalty" imposed on Canal by the
district court.
Canal's obligation to reimburse the attorney fees incurred by its insured's
equitable assignee arose as a direct result of its refusal to provide coverage to a person
the legislature wanted to protect. Attorney fees are provided by the statute because the
legislature understood the necessity of attorneys in the judicial system. Judges are a

15

part of the justice system. But they do not work for free. They do not expect their
wages to be reduced ad hoc through less-than-thorough reasoning, disagreements with
unpopular conclusions, or political considerations. To the contrary, the wages of
judges are well-protected. Attorneys in the judicial system deserve no lesser
consideration even if the safeguards are less comprehensive. This is not to protect
attorneys individually so much as it is to protect the administration of justice.
"In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the profession is a
branch of the administration of justice and not a mere
money-getting trade."

And a word of caution to the commission may be appropriate here.
While attorneys may not hope to be compensated to the full[n]
measure of the value of their time and work, they must not be
limited to such niggardly fees that they cannot afford to accept
compensation cases. And particularly where it has become
necessary to carry a compensation case to this court should the
commission be at least moderately liberal in allowance of
attorney's fees. Better that an applicant should lose 15% to 20%
of his benefits in attorney's fees than that he should receive no
benefits at all merely because no lawyer could afford or would
be willing to accept his case and properly present it to the
commission and the courts, for the main reason that the
compensation for such services would be grossly inadequate.
Thatcher v. Industrial Comm'n. 207 P.2d 178 (Utah 1949) (bold added).

11

"It is a simple fact in a lawyer's life that it takes about the same amount of
time to collect a note in the amount of $1,000 as it takes to collect a note for
$100,000." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988); accord
Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 174 (Utah App. 1990)
(explaining that courts must make findings to explain reduction of attorney fees and
to demonstrate that the court utilized proper factors for reducing fees).
16

The same considerations are present here. Had Canal accepted the offers
extended by Regal to simply repay the $3,000.00 it expended, neither Regal nor Canal
would have incurred any attorney fees. In addition, no prejudgment interest would
have accrued.12 Only because of Canal's decision to rely on a wildly inapposite
exclusion contained in its liability coverage did it become liable for the attorney fees
incurred by Christina Chatwin's equitable assignee. Canal's belated plea for
compassion is both hypocritical and, from a public policy standpoint, wrongheaded.
There is absolutely no merit to the Court of Appeals's argument that Christina
Chatwin's claim never existed.
While Canal claims (at p. 17) that its payment of Regal's attorney fees would
give Regal a "windfall," that assertion is utterly without merit. To the contrary, the
trial court refused to award all of Regal's attorney fees because it felt the initial
motions were not directly on point. This means that Regal will recover $2,205.00 less

12

Regal has never sought prejudgment interest or attorney fees for the period
prior to the time that it presented a proof of claim to Canal regarding the benefits
Canal owed to its equitable assignor, Christina Chatwin. There is no question that
Regal was bound by Christina Chatwin's rights which consisted of her obligation to
file a proof of claim. "Neither party to an agreement 'can be said to be in default (and
thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a decree for specific performance) until
the other party has tendered his own performance.'" Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp..
846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992) (quoting Century 21 All W. Real Estate & Inv.. Inc.
v. Webb. 645 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982)). The Court of Appeals erred by assuming that
an assignee cannot perform the duties of the assignor and that unless the assignor
personally performs an assignable duty, that duty has not been complied with.
Opinion at Tfl[ 10-11.
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than it will have paid to its attorneys. Ironically, this reduction13 by the trial court was
partly predicated on the parties' presentation of this arbitration/subrogation issue.
Canal has also insisted that this litigation was "motivated" by the availability of
attorney fees. This speculation is utterly without merit. There is a world of difference
between the availability of attorney fees making litigation practical (which was the
legislative intent behind their provision of attorney fees) and attorney fees being the
motivation for litigation. For every Bear River, State Farm, Allstate and Progressive
that violates the law with unreasoning impunity, a company like Regal can either fight,
follow,14 or fold. By refusing to follow or fold, Regal chose, by default, to fight. The
availability of attorney fees makes it a practical choice which accrues to the benefit of
its insureds and the public generally.

IV.

"SUBROGATION" MEANS THAT REGAL OBTAINED THE
RIGHTS OF ITS INSURED — IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT
REGAL'S PAYMENT TO CHATWIN TERMINATED HER
RIGHTS AGAINST CANAL.

The Court of Appeals insisted that Chatwin never personally made a claim;
13

In this case, the trial court's reduction was not irrational, ad hoc, or based on
any misrepresentations (in fact, this case is pleasantly devoid of dishonesty).
Therefore, Regal has not filed a cross-appeal relating to this issue because the trial
court properly performed its role. Even though Regal would respectfully disagree
with the court's reasoned conclusion, Regal received due process.
14

Regal is one of the approximately 30% of companies that used to pay what
it owed because its coverage counsel did not advise it to participate in
popular-but-unlawful, loopholes. Regal, whose coverage counsel is, coincidentally,
Kipp & Christian, did exactly what it should have done — at the time.
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therefore, there was no claim. This conclusion ignores decades of settled common law
regarding the nature and purpose of equity and subrogation.
The words "steps in shoes" and the axiom "the subrogee accrues to no greater
rights than those possessed by the subrogor" are frequently recited. The meaning
behind those words appears, on the other hand, to be lost in the clutter of familiarity.
Subrogation arises out of equitable principles, but only after one person pays
the debt of another. The doctrine then provides that the payor is "substituted" for the
payee. The Court of Appeals held that by virtue of Regal's payment of the debt of
another, it extinguished all of her rights. This conclusion flies in the face of settled
law by holding that the prerequisite to the remedy is, simultaneously, a complete
defense to the remedy.
Subrogation is a doctrine of "substitution." Because the no-fault statute creates
an indemnity contract, the insurer of the person who has incurred a lawful debt
relating to medical treatment must pay the insured's debt which is owed to the medical
providers.15 Therefore, Regal was not a volunteer; rather it had an obligation to pay its
15

This is a somewhat simplified view based on the plain language of the
statute rather than the Court's recent transformation of the non-defining relative
adjective (i.e., an adjective that tells us more about the modified noun but does not
help us identify them or it) "necessary" into both a qualitative adjective and,
simultaneously, a quantitative adjective. The unexplained and incomprehensible
complexities this Court recently adopted regarding which debts are entitled to
indemnity and which are not is glossed over herein because Canal has never disputed
the propriety of Chatwin's debts in this case. But, obviously, whatever the law might
be regarding the scope of PIP benefits would certainly be an important piece of
knowledge to assist in determining legislative intent and divining implied preemption.
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insured's valid enforceable obligations. By paying its insured's debts, Regal stepped
into the shoes of Chatwin and was entitled to the benefit of all the remedies Chatwin
possessed including all the means which Chatwin could employ to enforce payment.
Were the Court of Appeals correct, Canal would be unjustly enriched through
breaching its obligations. The law should not reward breach because such a reward
then encourages misconduct.16 Where, as here, there is a breach of duty, the no-fault
statute clearly placed risk of loss on the party whose refusal to perform its role caused
the loss to the complying party. This is not a "penalty." It is an enforcement
mechanism which can be avoided through compliance with clear and simple rules.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT EXERCISED ITS EQUITABLE POWERS.

The trial court properly exercised its equitable power. It ruled that Regal was
entitled to pursue Christina Chatwin's claims and her remedies. Canal has not proved
abuse of discretion; therefore, the Court of Appeals must be reversed.
VI.

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL ATTORNEY
FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES INCURRED ON THIS
APPEAL.

Appellate courts routinely allow attorney fees on appeal when contracts and/or

16

This is especially true in the insurance industry. There are many competing
companies all of which are attempting to maximize profits while, presumably,
obeying the law. Those insurers which are able to maximize profits through
breaching statutory obligations should not become positive examples to the industry.
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statutes expressly provide for fees. See Sprouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219, 227 (Utah
App. 1991). Plaintiff is entitled, and hereby demands, to recover its attorney fees
expended for this appeal, and each part of it.

VII.

THIS COURT'S CERTIORARI JURISDICTION IS LIMITED
TO THE ISSUES ACTUALLY ADDRESSED BY THE COURT
OF APPEALS.

Canal argues its contention that its disclosure was sufficient under Section 31A21-106 and Cullum. Regal does not believe that issue is properly before this Court:
"When exercising our certiorari jurisdiction, we review the decision of the court of
appeals and not that of the trial court." Longlev v. Leucadia Fin. Corp.. 2000 UT 69,
^ 13, 9 P.3d 762. Regal believes that this Court should reverse the Court of Appeals
and remand to that court.
However, Regal will provide a summary of its position here and refer the Court
to the briefs filed in the Court of Appeals in the event the Court exercises its broad
discretion and determines that review of that issue at this time is appropriate. This
Court recently revisited the disclosure requirements of Section 106:
Section 31A-21-106(1 )(a) of the Utah Code states that an
insurance policy may not contain any agreement or incorporate
any provision not fully set forth in the policy or in an
application or other document attached to and made a part of the
policy at the time of its delivery, unless the policy, application, or
agreement accurately reflects the terms of the incorporated
agreement, provision, or attached document. Utah Code Ann. §§
31 A-21 -106( 1 )(a) (2001). In addition, we have held that a mere
reference to statutory limits, without fully setting forth those limits
21

in the contract or an attached document, "violates the plain
language and purpose of section 31A-21-106." Cullum v. Farmers
Ins. Exch.. 857 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah 1993).
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dagleish. 2002 UT 59 at f 14 (bold added). And the
Court found a distinction:
Relying on this legal authority, the district court held that
Progressive improperly incorporated coverage limits by reference.
In so doing, however, the district court apparently overlooked a
section in the insurance policy, a copy of which was submitted to
the court in Progressive's summary judgment motion, that
explicitly defines "minimum statutory limits." Indeed, the plain
language of that policy defines the phrase "minimum statutory
limits" in elaborate detail:
Id. Instead of arguing that its policy similarly defined the extent of its PIP coverage in
elaborate detail, Canal argues (at pp. 19-21) that it excluded PIP coverage (despite the
fact that PIP coverage is expressly set forth as a coverage provided for the semi-trailer
on its declarations page attached to Canal's Brief at Exhibit C) by its reference to
"Title 31 A." This method, it asserts, is appropriate because Canal writes policies in a
lot of states.17 Canal's argument lacks any merit.
Canal can "reasonably be expected to be aware of periodic changes in the law
that may affect PIP coverage requirements." More importantly, Canal is statutorily
required to be aware of the law and set forth the both extensions of coverage18 and

17

Canal can license PIP coverage endorsements from I.S.O. if it does not want
to be aware of changes in the law.
18

Canal's argument that its method is a benefit to its insureds is not
persuasive. Regardless of what Canal's policy says, insureds and third-party
22

limitations of coverage in its policies.
Regal is not attempting to paint Canal as one of the many "sinister" companies
that routinely violate the law expecting courts to make excuses for their
non-performance. And Regal is not "unhappy" because it is a corporation devoid of
feelings of any kind. Its position in this case is not based on anybody's feelings
because two insurance companies are involved and the injured person was not
physically and economically tortured by Regal's intransigence.19 Regal is entitled to
be reimbursed for having performed Canal's role and for having to force Canal to
comply with its obligations. Otherwise, intransigence will be the new standard of care
which all insurance companies will be forced to espouse in order to compete.
Canal provided PIP coverage for the semi-trailer in its declarations and its
endorsement. If it had wanted to retract those extensions, it was permitted to do so
because of the existence of the statutory exception set forth at Section 302(2).
However, in order to restrict the coverage it had afforded the trailer in exchange for a
premium, "the insurer must specify that it is restricting coverage in this way by

beneficiaries are entitled to coverage to the full extent of the minimum mandatory
coverages set forth in Utah's insurance code. What Canal ignores is that it is
permitted to provide more coverage than is mandatory. And if it does provide PIP
coverage for a semi-trailer, as it did in this case, it cannot retract that by a vague
reference to Title 31 A.
19

The claims departments of most insurance companies are not organized in
such a way that would make the Court of Appeals' arguments practical. If there
might be another source of payment, claims departments are advised to pay and send
the matter to the subrogation department.
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including the language of subsection (2)[] in its policy." Universal Underwriters v.
State Farm. 925 P.2d 1270 (Utah App. 1996). Canal "failed to include this necessary
statutory language in the polic[y]" issued to KC Trucking. 14 Therefore, it '"did not
take advantage of the allowable statutory limitation of coverage[20] to [semi-trailers]
under Utah Code An[n.] § 31A-22-30[2](2)[]."' Id

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Regal was properly awarded a judgment against Canal for PIP
expenses, interest and attorney fees because it is the equitable assignee of all the rights
possessed by Christina Chatwin. Her rights were not extinguished by Regal's
performance of its duties. Judgment entered against Canal should be enforced, and
attorney fees incurred in connection with this appeal should be awarded.
DATED this / ',$~day of October, 2002.
CARR & WADDOUPS

It J. WADDOUPS

Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellee / Appellant
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This is properly viewed under a preemption analysis too. By mandating
coverage and allowing certain limitations, the legislature implicitly occupied the field
rendering any other coverage limitations (which would otherwise permitted under the
freedom of contract) to be unenforceable.
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